

The Hardness of Revising Defeasible Preferences

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RuleML 2014 Prague, August 20th 2014



Australian Government
Department of Broadband,
Communications and the Digital Economy
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NICTA Funding and Supporting Members and Partners



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What preferences are?

- Means to choose a course of action to achieve a goal

We focus on a computational study of preference revision

- Fundamental in non-monotonic reasoning with partial/conflicting information → knowledge subject to continuous changes
- Like legal domain

We study scenarios where preference modification is the only way to change the knowledge about the environment

- An average citizen has no power to change the Law, nor decide what norms are effective in a particular context. . .
- . . . but only argue what norms prevail over others
 - idea underlying legal principles like *lex superior*, *posterior*, *specialis*

Three type of knowledge:

Facts always true

Rules as relationships among propositional atoms

Strict $cat(X) \rightarrow_{r_1} mammal(X)$

Defeasible $cat(X) \Rightarrow_{r_2} eatBirds(X)$

Defeaters $justFed(X) \rightsquigarrow_{r_3} \neg eatBirds(X)$

Preferences over rules, e.g., $r_5 > r_4$

$cat(X) \Rightarrow_{r_4} eatBirds(X)$

$domesticCat(X) \Rightarrow_{r_5} \neg eatBirds(X)$

Defeasible theories as tuples $(F, R, >)$

- 1 Give an argument for the conclusion we want to prove
- 2 Consider all possible counterarguments to it
- 3 Rebut all counterarguments
 - Defeat the argument by a stronger one
 - Undercut the argument by showing that some of the premises do not hold

We use proof tags

- $+∂p$ (p is defeasibly proved)
- $-∂p$ (p is defeasibly refuted)

When p is a **tautology** in this framework?

- Classical sense: p true in every interpretation
- In our case: $D \vdash +\partial p$ regardless to $>$

- 1 p is a fact. . . And?
- 2 (Defeasible) reasoning chains for p with no undercuts nor rebuttals. . . But there is more.
- 3

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow_{r_1} I & \Rightarrow_{r_2} \neg a \\ & \Rightarrow_{r_3} a \Rightarrow_{r_4} p \\ & \Rightarrow_{r_5} b \Rightarrow_{r_6} p \\ \Rightarrow_{r_7} \neg I & \Rightarrow_{r_8} \neg b \end{aligned}$$

Preference Revision Problem

INSTANCE: A defeasible theory $D = (F, R, >)$, and a literal p .

QUESTION: Is it possible to change $>$ into $>'$ such that $D' = (F, R, >')$ and either

- 1 If $D \vdash +\partial p$, then $D' \vdash -\partial p$?
- 2 If $D \vdash -\partial p$, then $D' \vdash +\partial p$?

Reduction from 3-SAT exploiting the previous rule pattern

- Literals of the formula becomes literals of a defeasible theory
- Each clause is transformed into a set of defeasible rules involving a fixed literal p

To Be More Specific. . .



Given a 3-SAT formula $\Gamma = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n C_i$ such that $C_i = \bigvee_{j=1}^3 a_j^i$, we define the **Γ -transformation** as the operation that maps Γ into

$$R^\Gamma = \{r_{ij}^a : \Rightarrow a_j^i \\ r_{ij} : a_j^i \Rightarrow c_i \\ r_{\sim i} : \Rightarrow \sim c_i \\ r_i : \sim c_i \Rightarrow p\}.$$

We proved that:

- if p is tautological, then Γ is not satisfiable;
- if p is non-tautological, then Γ is satisfiable.

Our work comes full circle in computational study of defeasible revision

- 1 Revision of factual knowledge corresponds to update operation (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991)
- 2 Revision by changing rule set studied by Billington et al., 1999 (polynomial time)
- 3 Revision by changing preferences. . . Well, we just did it

Thank you for the attention!

Any question?